This article is for informational purposes only and is not financial advice. TheGatBull may earn a commission from some links at no cost to you — see our disclosure and full disclaimer.
The market hunts the “AI trade” in chipmakers. Korean insiders look one link down — at the copper and subsea cable that carry the electricity to those chips. And here’s the catch outsiders keep missing: the real cable leader isn’t even listed. This is not financial advice.
This is Episode 4 of our series on the AI data center power supply chain — a close-up on the wires and HVDC cables that connect everything.
The short answer: there is no clean one-ticker bet
There is no single, clean large-cap way to buy Korea’s cable and HVDC theme — because the pure leader, LS Cable & System, is unlisted. So the first decision is which exposure you want: a turnaround with growing subsea capacity (Daehan Cable), cable plus a rare-earth option (LS Eco Energy), or diluted holding-company exposure (LS Corp). The current is real — but you should also price in that these Korean names are less-proven late movers next to global No.1 Prysmian.
Why now — not the chips, but what carries power to them
This series has run on one line: AI eats electricity, and that electricity only arrives if someone lays the cable. We’ve covered transformers (Ep.1), generation (Ep.2), and storage (Ep.3); today it’s the blood vessels — wires and HVDC cable.
Three demands arrived at once. First, AI data centers need gigawatts of new power. Second, offshore wind must carry electricity made at sea back to land, which requires subsea cable. Third, aging grids need replacing. The global HVDC cable market is estimated to grow from ~$9.6 billion in 2024 to ~$59.9 billion by 2034 (a 24.3% CAGR). In Europe alone, an estimated cumulative 22,800 km of high-voltage subsea cable is projected to fall short between 2026 and 2040. When supply can’t keep up, pricing power concentrates in the few who can build.
🎩 Under the Gat — When Wall Street looks for the “AI trade” in GPUs, Korean insiders look at the copper and subsea cable that deliver electricity to those GPUs. One thing matters: only a handful of companies worldwide can actually make this. So it’s less “did they win the order” and more “do they have the capacity.” For you, that means watching the factories and cable-laying ships behind the backlog — not just the backlog itself.
The three Korean routes — and the unlisted trap
This is where outsiders stumble most. Korea’s undisputed cable leader is LS Cable & System — and it is not listed. So a foreigner who says “I’ll buy Korea’s No.1 cable maker” can’t actually buy that No.1. The listed routes are three, each with different exposure.
- Daehan Cable (KRX: 001440) — the turnaround No.2, betting on subsea. Its profile changed after the Hoban Group acquisition. Q1 2026 brought record quarterly results — consolidated revenue of about ₩1.08 trillion (≈$0.8B) and operating profit of about ₩60.4 billion (≈$44M, up 122.9%) — with an order backlog at an all-time high of about ₩3.83 trillion (≈$2.8B). It is building a second subsea-cable plant in Dangjin (targeting 2027) and an HVDC test center, and recently acquired a 10,000-tonne dedicated cable-laying vessel,[1] the Skandi Connector, from Norway’s DOF — plugging the gap between making cable and laying it. It won the second lot of the Donghae-an–Dongseoul HVDC line (about ₩146 billion / ≈$107M). Profile: the most direct pure-cable exposure of the three.
- LS Eco Energy (KRX: 229640) — cable plus a rare-earth “option.” Originally a Vietnam-based cable company (an LS Cable affiliate), it is now widening its identity into rare earths and permanent magnets. Q1 2026 revenue was about ₩296.4 billion (≈$216M) and operating profit about ₩20.1 billion (≈$15M) — both record quarters, with a ~6.8% operating margin well above the 3–4% Korean cable-industry average (extra-high-voltage cable revenue rose 177% year on year). With Australia’s Lynas, it is building a non-China rare-earth value chain in Vietnam: Lynas oxide → first-stage metal processing at an LSCV plant in Vietnam → supply to LS Cable’s magnet plant. Stage 1 is samarium-cobalt magnets for defense, Stage 2 heavy rare earths (dysprosium, terbium), Stage 3 neodymium (EVs, robots, wind). Its Ho Chi Minh refining-infrastructure investment is about ₩31.5 billion (~$21 million), with mass production targeted for H2 2026 and first revenue in H1 2027. Profile: cable exposure plus a separate rare-earth story — its appeal and its volatility.
- LS Corp (KRX: 006260) — the holding company that owns the unlisted LS Cable. Since you can’t buy LS Cable directly, its parent holding company LS Corp is the workaround. The downside is clear: a holding company carries many businesses beyond cable, so exposure is diluted, and Korea’s typical holding-company discount applies (the Street commonly marks listed subsidiary stakes down by around 70%). Profile: lower volatility, but not a pure bet.
🎩 Under the Gat — Here’s the local trap outsiders miss. “Let’s buy Korea’s No.1 cable maker” → that No.1 (LS Cable) isn’t for sale. What’s left is the No.2 (Daehan), an optioned small-cap (LS Eco Energy), and a diluted holding company (LS Corp) — three proxies, not the real thing. The takeaway? Choose by what you’re exposed to, not by what you’re buying. Pure core, Daehan; a separate catalyst (rare earths), LS Eco Energy; lower volatility, LS Corp.
Bull vs. bear — both sides, fairly
The bull case. Demand is structural and multi-year. AI data centers, offshore wind, and aging-grid replacement all arrived together, and so few companies have the cable and the laying ships that pricing power should last. National backbone projects like the roughly ₩11.5 trillion (≈$8.4B) West Coast “energy highway” fill Korean order books. Prysmian’s record HVDC backlog (~€16 billion, rising toward ~€17 billion in Q1 2026) shows the cycle is already real in Europe.
The bear case. First, it’s priced in. When a theme catches fire, Korean small-caps run ahead of fundamentals (the donghak gaemi retail army’s love of theme stocks amplifies the swings). Second, bottlenecks. Even with orders in hand, a shortage of cable-laying vessels and plant capacity can push revenue recognition two to three years out — and industry warnings point to a global vessel crunch worsening before 2028. Third, the verification gap: Korean late movers’ full-turnkey subsea HVDC track record is still being built, while Prysmian and Nexans are full EPC players that own their laying fleets. Fourth, copper and metal prices and FX.
| Daehan Cable (KRX: 001440) | Prysmian (global anchor, Italy) | |
|---|---|---|
| Business | Wire, subsea, HVDC (restructuring) | Wire, subsea, HVDC full EPC (global No.1) |
| Position | Korea’s No.2 (No.1 LS Cable is unlisted) | World No.1 (14%+ market share in 2024) |
| HVDC backlog | ~₩3.83 trillion (company-wide, record) | ~€16B in HVDC alone (~€17B in Q1 2026) |
| Market cap | ~₩10.5 trillion (≈$7.7B, Jun 2026) | ~€42B (€41.85B, May 2026) |
| Laying vessels | Adding capacity (acquired the Skandi Connector) | Owns its own fleet |
| Decisive difference | Late mover → capacity and turnkey still being proven | Vertically complete, from laying to cable |
Not a perfect parallel — Prysmian is a full EPC with cable, laying ships, and installation under one roof, while Korea’s late movers are building that vertical integration now. Same theme, different maturity. A secondary anchor is Nexans (France, a subsea heavyweight); for US readers, Quanta Services (NYSE: PWR) doesn’t make cable but is the leading proxy for US grid construction — the American face of the grid super-cycle.
Local context — why Korea can lay an ₩11.5 trillion line fast
One more local variable for foreign investors: execution speed and state direction. The push behind a multi-trillion-won backbone built on a tight timeline is really three things stacked together: a state-led structure in which KEPCO and the energy ministry drive procurement and permitting; a track record of standing up semiconductor fabs and battery lines faster than anywhere else; and a speed-first culture often called ppalli-ppalli (hurry-hurry). But that speed cuts both ways — the same drive that compresses schedules becomes over-speed and slippage risk when vessels and capacity can’t keep up. “Fast” is not the same as “well” — and that’s worth holding in mind, especially for investors new to Korean infrastructure.
The risks — what even a bull must concede
- Orders ≠ revenue. The single number to watch each quarter is the speed at which backlog converts to revenue. Vessel and capacity bottlenecks plus the late-mover verification gap are the core issues.
- Theme overshoot. Small-caps can run far ahead of fundamentals; a sharp pullback follows when they can’t keep up.
- The rare-earth option is early. LS Eco Energy’s rare-earth revenue isn’t expected until H1 2027 — it’s an option, not yet a business.
- Inputs and FX. Copper and metal prices and the won’s swings move margins.
🎩 Under the Gat — Two things are true at once: the cycle is real, and the Korean names are still proving themselves. So the bear’s one-liner — “a backlog isn’t revenue” — is the whole game. The one number that separates the real thing from the theme is how fast that backlog turns into sales. A view, not advice.
Footnote — [1] what is a “cable-laying vessel” (CLV)? A CLV is a specialized ship built to lay cable on the seabed. In subsea HVDC, making the cable and laying it at sea are two different capabilities: laying vessels are scarce worldwide and take years to build, so they are widely considered the real bottleneck of the business. The Skandi Connector that Daehan Cable acquired from Norwegian offshore-services firm DOF is a 10,000-tonne class vessel — filling the company’s weak spot (cable-making capacity but no installation ship) and moving it a step closer to “make-and-lay” turnkey delivery.
Disclaimer: This article is for information only and is not financial advice. Market caps and small-cap prices should be re-checked at publish time against the KRX.
Frequently Asked QuestionsHow do I directly buy Korea’s No.1 cable maker?
You can’t. The leader, LS Cable & System, is unlisted. The listed routes are Daehan Cable (KRX: 001440), LS Eco Energy (KRX: 229640), and the holding company LS Corp (KRX: 006260) — and each carries a different kind of exposure. This is not financial advice.
Which of the three is closest to a pure cable play?
Daehan Cable (001440) — its core exposure to subsea and HVDC is the most direct. LS Eco Energy mixes in a rare-earth story, and LS Corp is diluted by its holding-company structure.
Is LS Eco Energy a cable stock or a rare-earth stock?
Both — which is exactly why it is volatile. A rare-earth and permanent-magnet option sits on top of its cable cash flow, and revenue from that option is expected to start landing only from the first half of 2027.
What is the closest comparison for a US investor?
For manufacturers, Prysmian and Nexans (Europe). For a US grid-build proxy, Quanta Services (NYSE: PWR) — which installs rather than makes cable, but is the cleanest US face of the grid super-cycle.
What is the biggest risk?
The speed at which orders convert into revenue. Cable-laying-vessel and plant-capacity bottlenecks plus the late-mover verification gap are the core issues, and small-caps carry a sharp pullback risk if the theme runs ahead of fundamentals. Not financial advice.
This article is for informational purposes only and is not financial advice. TheGatBull may earn a commission from some links at no cost to you — see our disclosure and full disclaimer.